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JED Prop. v. Coastline RE Holdings NV Corp., 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 11 (Mar. 5, 2015)1
POSTPONEMENT OF A TRUSTEE’S SALE: NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
Summary
The Court determined that NRS 107.082(2) does not require a trustee to give notice of a
sale pursuant to NRS 107.080 that has been postponed by oral proclamation three times “unless,
after the third oral postponement has been given, the sale's date, time, or place is later changed.”
Background
Appellee, Coastline RE Holdings NV Corp. (“Coastline”), or its trustee recorded a notice
of a trustee’s sale, seeking to foreclose on real property to secure a debt by appellant, JED
Property, LLC (“JED”). The sale was orally postponed three times before being made at the time
and place set by the third postponement.
After Coastline initiated suit, JED brought a counterclaim against Coastline, arguing that
it violated NRS 107.082(2) by failing to give written notice of the sale’s time and place as
provided in NRS 107.080 after it orally postponed the sale three times. Coastline filed a motion
for summary judgment. The district court granted Coastline’s motion and awarded attorney fees
and costs.
Discussion
Standard of review
Citing past decisions2, the Court determined that de novo review applies to arguments
concerning summary judgment, statutory interpretation, and the award of attorney fees and costs.
NRS 107.082(2)’s plain meaning
In accordance with Davis v. Beling 3 , the Court interpreted the meaning of NRS
107.082(2) as an unambiguous statute by reading it as a whole, giving effect to each word and
phrase. The Court held that in the context of the statute it referencesNRS 107.080, the plain
meaning of NRS 107.082(2) provides that written notice of “new sale information” is required
only if the date, time, or place of a trustee’s sale changes after the third oral postponement.4
The district court did not err in granting summary judgment
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The Court explained that summary judgment is proper when there are no genuine issues
of material fact.5 Because the parties did not dispute that the trustee’s sale was orally postponed
three times and that the sale occurred on the date and at the place identified in the third
postponed, the Court found that the district court correctly granted summary judgment for
Coastline.
The district court did not err when awarding attorney fees
Finally, the Court determined that because summary judgment in favor of Coastline was
proper, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs to
Coastline.
Conclusion
Because JED submitted no evidence that the day, time, or place of the trustee’s sale
changed after the third postponement, the Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Coastline and the district court’s award of attorney fees and costs.
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